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Abstract
The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning are two puz-
zling examples of probabilistic confirmation. In both cases, a lack of
knowledge apparently yields surprising conclusions. Since they are for-
mulated within a Bayesian framework, they constitute a challenge to
Bayesianism. Several attempts, some successful, have been made to
avoid these conclusions, but some versions of these arguments cannot
be dissolved within the framework of orthodox Bayesianism. I show
that adopting an imprecise framework of probabilistic reasoning allows
for a more adequate representation of ignorance in Bayesian reasoning
and explains away these puzzles.
1 Introduction
The Doomsday paradox and the appeal to anthropic bounds to solve the
cosmological constant problem are two examples of puzzles of probabilistic
confirmation. These arguments both make ‘cosmic’ predictions: the former
gives us a probable end date for humanity, and the second a probable value of
the vacuum energy density of the universe. They both seem to allow one to
draw unwarranted conclusions from a lack of knowledge, and yet one way of
formulating them makes them a straightforward application of Bayesianism.
They call for a framework of inductive logic that allows one to represent
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ignorance better than what can be achieved by orthodox Bayesianism so as
to block these conclusions.
1.1 The Doomsday Argument
The Doomsday argument is a family of arguments about humanity’s likely
survival.1 There are mainly two versions of the argument discussed in the
literature, both of which appeal to a form of Copernican principle (or princi-
ple of typicality or mediocrity). A first version of the argument endorsed by,
e.g., John Leslie (1990) dictates a probability shift in favor of theories that
predict earlier end dates for our species assuming that we are a typical—
rather than atypical—member of that group.
The other main version of the argument, referred to as the ‘delta-t ar-
gument,’ was given by Richard Gott (1993) and has provoked both outrage
and genuine scientific interest.2 It claims to allow one to make a prediction
about the total duration of any process of indefinite duration based only
on the assumption that the moment of observation is randomly selected.
A variant of this argument, which gives equivalent predictions, reasons in
terms of random “sampling” of one’s rank in a sequential process (Gott,
1994).3 The argument goes as follows:
Let r be my birth rank (i.e., I am the rth human to be born), and N the
total number of humans that will ever be born.
1. Assume that there is nothing special about my rank r. Following the
principle of indifference, for all r, the probability of r conditional on
N is p(r|N) =
1
N
.
2. Assume the following improper prior probability distribution4 for N :
p(N) =
k
N
. k is a normalizing constant, whose value doesn’t matter.
1See, e.g., (Bostrom, 2002, § 6–7), (Richmond, 2006) for reviews.
2See, e.g., (Goodman, 1994) for opprobrium and (Wells, 2009;
Griffiths and Tenenbaum, 2006) for praise.
3The latter version doesn’t violate the reflection principle—entailed by
conditionalization—according to which an agent ought to have now a certain credence in
a given proposition if she is certain she will have it at a later time (Monton and Roush,
2001).
4As Gott (1994) recalls, this choice of prior is fairly standard (albeit contentious)
in statistical analysis. It’s the Jeffreys prior for the unbounded parameter N , such that
p(N) dN ∝ d lnN ∝
dN
N
. This means that the probability for N to be in any logarithmic
interval is the same. This prior is called improper because it is not normalizable, and it
is usually argued that it is justified when it yields a normalizable posterior.
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3. This choice of distributions p(r|N) and p(N) gives us the prior distri-
bution p(r):
p(r) =
∫ N=∞
N=r
p(r|N)p(N) dN =
∫ N=∞
N=r
k
N2
dN =
k
r
.
4. Then, Bayes’s theorem gives us p(N |r) =
p(r|N) · p(N)
p(r)
=
r
N2
, which
favors small N .
To find an estimate with a confidence α, we solve p(N ≤ x|r) = α for
x, with p(N ≤ x|r) =
∫ x
r
p(N |r) dN . Upon learning r, we are able to
make a prediction about N with a 95%-level confidence. Here, we have
p(N ≤ 20r|r) = 0.95. That is, we have p(N > 20r|r) < 5%.
According to that argument, we can make a prediction for N based only
on knowing our rank r and on being indifferent about any value r conditional
on N may take. This result should strike us as surprising: we shouldn’t be
able to learn something from nothing! If N is unbounded, an appeal to our
typical position shouldn’t allow us to make any prediction at all, and yet it
does.
1.2 Anthropic Reasoning in Cosmology
Another probabilistic argument that claims to allow one to make a predic-
tion from a lack of knowledge is commonly used in cosmology, in particular
to solve the cosmological constant problem (i.e., explain the value of the
vacuum energy density ρV ). This parameter presents physicists with two
main problems:5
1. The time coincidence problem: we happen to live at the brief epoch—
by cosmological standards—of the universe’s history when it is possible
to witness the transition from the domination of matter and radiation
to vacuum energy (ρM ∼ ρV ).
2. There is a large discrepancy—of 120 order of magnitudes—between
the (very small) observed values of ρV and the (very large) values
suggested by particle-physics models.
5See (Carroll, 2000; Sola`, 2013) for an overview of the cosmological constant problem.
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Anthropic selection effects (i.e., our sampling bias as observers existing
at a certain time and place and in a universe that must allow the existence
of life) have been used to explain both problems. In the absence of sat-
isfying explanations, anthropic selection effects make the coincidence less
unexpected, and account for the discrepancy between observations and pos-
sible expectations from available theoretical background. But there is no
known reason why having ρM ∼ ρV should matter to the advent of life.
Steven Weinberg and his collaborators (Weinberg, 1987, 2000; Martel et al.,
1998), among others, proposed anthropic bounds on the possible values of
ρV . Furthermore, they argued that anthropic considerations may have a
stronger, predictive role. The idea is that we should conditionalize the prob-
ability of different values of ρV on the number of observers they allow: the
most likely value of ρV is the one that allows for the largest number of
galaxies (taken as a proxy for the number of observers).6 The probability
measure for ρV is then as follows:
dp(ρV ) = ν(ρV ) · p⋆(ρV ) dρV ,
where p⋆(ρ) dρV is the prior probability distribution, and ν(ρV ) the average
number of galaxies which form for ρV .
By assuming that there is no known reason why the likelihood of ρV
should be special at the observed value, and because the allowed range of
ρV is very far from what we would expect from available theories, Weinberg
and his collaborators argued that it is reasonable to assume that the prior
probability distribution is constant within the anthropically allowed range,
so that dp(ρV ) can be calculated as proportional to ν(ρV ) dρV (Weinberg,
2000, 2). Weinberg then predicted that the value of ρV would be close
to the mean value in that range (assumed to yield the largest number of
observers). This “principle of mediocrity,” as Alexander Vilenkin (1995)
called it, assumes that we are typical observers.
Thus, anthropic considerations not only help establish the prior probabil-
ity distribution for ρV by providing bounds, but they also allow one to make
a prediction regarding its observed value. This method has yielded predic-
tions for ρV only a few orders of magnitudes apart from the observed value.
7
This improvement—from 120 orders of magnitude to only a few—has been
seen by their proponents as vindicating anthropically-based approaches.
6This assumption is contentious; see, e.g., (Aguirre, 2001) for an alternative proposal.
7The median value of the distribution obtained by such anthropic prediction is about
20 times the observed value ρobsV (Pogosian et al., 2004).
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1.3 The Problem: Ex Nihilo Nihil Fit
The Doomsday argument and anthropic reasoning share a similar structure:
1) a uniform prior probability distribution reflects an initial state of igno-
rance or indifference, and 2) an appeal to typicality or mediocrity is used to
make a prediction. This is puzzling: these two assumptions of indifference
and typicality are meant to express neutrality, and yet from them alone
we seem to be getting a lot of information. But assuming neutrality alone
should not allow us to learn anything!
If anthropic considerations were only able to provide us with one bound
(either lower or upper bound), then the argument used to make a prediction
about the vacuum energy density ρV would be analogous to Gott’s 1993
‘delta-t argument’: without knowing anything about, say, a parameter’s
upper bound, a uniform prior probability distribution over all possible ranges
and the appeal to typicality of the observed value favors lower values for that
parameter.
I will briefly review several approaches taken to dispute the validity of
the results obtained from these arguments. We will see that dropping the
assumption of typicality isn’t enough to avoid these paradoxical conclusions.
I will show that, when dealing with events we are completely ignorant or
indifferent about, one can use an imprecise, Bayesian-friendly framework
that better handles ignorance or indifference.
2 Typicality, Indifference, Neutrality
2.1 How Crucial to Those Arguments Is the Assumption of
Typicality?
The appeal to typicality is central to Gott’s ‘delta-t argument,’ Leslie’s ver-
sion of the Doomsday argument, and Weinberg’s prediction. This assump-
tion has generated much of the philosophical discussion about the Doomsday
argument in particular. Nick Bostrom (2002) offered a challenge to what he
calls the Self-Sampling Assumption (SSA), according to which “one should
reason as if one were a random sample from the set of all observers in
one’s reference class.” In order to avoid the consequence of the Doomsday
argument, Bostrom suggested to adopt what he calls the Self-Indicating As-
sumption (SIA): “Given the fact that you exist, you should (other things
equal) favor hypotheses according to which many observers exist over hy-
potheses on which few observers exist.” (Bostrom, 2002) But as he noted
himself (Bostrom, 2002, 122-126), this SIA is not acceptable as a general
5
principle. Indeed, as Dennis Dieks (1992) summarized:
Such a principle would entail, e.g., the unpalatable conclusion
that armchair philosophizing would suffice for deciding between
cosmological models that predict vastly different chances for the
development of human civilization.The infinity of the universe
would become certain a priori.
The biggest problem with Doomsday-type arguments resting on the SSA
is that their conclusion depends on the choice of reference class. What con-
stitutes “one’s reference class” seems entirely arbitrary or ill-defined: is my
reference class that of all humans, mammals, philosophers, etc.? Anthropic
predictions can be the object of a similar criticism: the value of the cosmo-
logical constant most favorable to the advent of life (as we know it) may not
be the same as that most favorable to the existence of intelligent observers,
which might be definable indifferent ways.
Relatedly, Radford Neal (2006) argued that conditionalizing on non-
indexical information (i.e., all the information at the disposal of the agent
formulating the Doomsday argument, including all their memories) repro-
duces the effects of assuming both SSA and SIA. Conditionalizing on the
probability that an observer with all their non-indexical information exists
(which is higher for a later Doomsday, and highest if there is no Doomsday
at all) blocks the consequence of the Doomsday argument, without invok-
ing such ad hoc principles, and avoids the reference-class problem (see also
Dieks, 1992).
Although full non-indexical conditioning cancels out the effects of Leslie’s
Doomsday argument (and, similarly, anthropic predictions), it is not clear
that it also allows one to avoid the conclusion of Gott’s version of the Dooms-
day argument. Neal (2006, 20) dismisses Gott’s argument because it rests
only on an “unsupported” assumption of typicality. There are indeed no
good reasons to endorse typicality a priori (see, e.g., Hartle and Srednicki,
2007). One might then hope that not assuming typicality would suffice to
dissolve these cosmic puzzles. Irit Maor et al. (2008) showed for instance
that without it, anthropic considerations don’t allow one to really make
predictions about the cosmological constant, beyond just providing unsur-
prising boundaries, namely, that the value of the cosmological constant must
be such that life is possible.
My approach in this paper, however, will not be to question the assump-
tion of typicality. Indeed, in Gott’s version of the Doomsday argument given
in § 1.1, we would obtain a prediction even if we didn’t assume typicality.
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Instead of assuming a flat probability distribution for our rank r conditional
on the total number of humans N , p(r|N) =
1
N
, let’s assume a non-uniform
distribution. For instance, let’s assume a distribution that favors our be-
ing born in humanity’s timeline’s first decile (i.e., one that peaks around
r = 0.1×N). We would then obtain a different prediction for N than if we
had assumed one that peaks around r = 0.9×N . This reasoning, however,
yields an unsatisfying result if taken to the limit: if we assume a likelihood
probability distribution for r conditional on N sharply peaked at r = 0, we
would still obtain a prediction for N upon learning r (see Figure 1).8
Figure 1: Posterior probability distributions forN conditional on r, obtained
for r = 100 and assuming different likelihood distributions for r conditional
on N (i.e., with different assumptions as to our relative place in humanity’s
timeline), which each peaks at different values τ = r
N
. The lowermost curve
corresponds to a likelihood distribution that peaks at τ → 0, i.e., if we
assume N →∞.
Therefore, in Gott’s Doomsday argument, we would obtain a prediction
at any confidence-level, whatever assumption we make as to our typical-
8Tegmark and Bostrom (2005) used a similar reasoning to derive an upper bound on
the date of a Doomsday catastrophe.
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ity or atypicality, and we would even obtain one if we assume N → ∞.
Consequently, it is toward the question of a probabilistic representation of
ignorance or indifference that I will now turn my attention.
2.2 A Neutral Principle of Indifference?
One could hope that a more adequate prior probability distribution—one
that better reflects our ignorance and is normalizable—may prevent the con-
clusion of these cosmic puzzles (especially Gott’s Doomsday argument). The
idea that a uniform probability distribution is not a satisfying representa-
tion of ignorance is nothing new; this discussion is as old as the principle of
indifference itself.9 As argued by John Norton (2010), a uniform probabil-
ity distribution is unable to fulfill invariance requirements that one should
expect of a representation of ignorance or indifference:
- non-additivity,
- invariance under redescription,
- invariance under negation: if we are ignorant or indifferent as to
whether or not α, we must be equally ignorant as to whether or not
¬α.10
For instance, in the case of the cosmological constant problem, if we
adopt a uniform probability distribution for the value of the vacuum energy
density ρV over an anthropically allowed range of length µ, then we are
committed to assert, e.g., that ρV is 3 times more likely to be found in a any
range of length
µ
3
than in any other range of length
µ
9
. This is very different
from indifference or ignorance, hence the requirement of non-additivity for
a representation of ignorance.
These criteria for a representation of ignorance or indifference cast doubt
on the possibility for a probabilistic logic of induction to overcome these
limitations.11 I will argue that an imprecise model of Bayesianism, in which
our credences can be fuzzy, will be able to explain away these problems
without abandoning Bayesianism altogether.
9See, e.g., (Syversveen, 1998) for a short review on the problem of representing non-
informative priors.
10For an extended discussion about criteria for a representation of ignorance—with
imprecise probabilities in particular—see (de Cooman and Miranda, 2007, § 4–5).
11The same goes for improper priors, as was argued, e.g., by Dawid et al. (1973).
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3 Dissolving the Puzzles with Imprecise Credence
3.1 Imprecise Credence
It has been argued (see, e.g., Levi, 1974; Walley, 1991; Joyce, 2010) that
Bayesian credences need not have sharp values, and that there can be im-
precise credences (or ‘imprecise probabilities’ by misuse of language). An
imprecise credence model recognizes “that our beliefs should not be any more
definitive or unambiguous than the evidence we have for them.” (Joyce,
2010, 320)
Joyce defended an imprecise model of Bayesianism in which credences
are not represented merely by a range of values, but rather by a family of
(probabilistic) credence functions. In this imprecise probability model,
1. A believer’s overall credal state can be represented by a
family C of credence functions [ci] (. . . ). Facts about the
person’s opinions correspond to properties common to all
the credence functions in her credal state.
2. If the believer is rational, then every credence function in
C is a probability.
3. If a person in credal state C learns that some event D ob-
tains (. . . ), then her post-learning state will be
CD =
{
c(X|D) = c(X)
c(D|X)
c(D)
: c ∈ C
}
.
4. A rational decision-maker with credal state C is obliged to
prefer one action α to another α∗ when α’s expected utility
exceeds that of α∗ relative to every credence function in C.
(Joyce, 2010, 288, my emphasis)
There are several criteria for decision-making with imprecise probabilities
between two propositions. Depending on the criterion chosen, one will prefer
an event to another event if
- it has maximum lower expected value (Γ−minimax criterion),
- it has maximum higher expected value (Γ−maximax),
- it has maximum expected value for all distributions in the credal set
(maximality),
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- it has a higher expected value for at least one distribution in the credal
set (E−admissibility), or
- its lower expected value on all distributions in the credal set is greater
than the other event’s highest expected value on all distributions (in-
terval dominance).12
This model allows one to simultaneously represent sharp and imprecise
credences, but also comparative probabilities. It can accommodate sharp
credences and then the usual condition of additivity. But it can also ac-
commodate less sharply defined relationships when credences are fuzzy. It
does so by means of a family of credence functions, each of which is treated
as in orthodox Bayesianism. This model is interesting when it comes to
representing ignorance or indifference: it can do so with a set of functions
that disagree with each other.
3.2 Blurring Out Gott’s Doomsday Argument: Apocalypse
Not Now
Let us see how we can reframe Gott’s Doomsday argument with an impre-
cise prior credence for the total number of humans N , or more generally for
the length of any process of indefinite duration X. Let our prior credence in
X, be represented by a family of credal functions {cγ : cγ ∈ CX}, each nor-
malizable and defined on R>0. Thus, we avoid improper prior distributions.
All we assume is that X is finite but can be indefinitely large. We have
no reason to exclude from our prior credal set CX any distribution that is
monotonically decreasing and such that ∀cγ ∈ CX , limX→∞(cγ(X)) = 0.
13
Let then our prior credence consist in the following set of functions, all of
which decrease but not at the same rate (i.e., similar to a family of Pareto
distributions),
{
cγ(X) =
kγ
Xγ
: cγ ∈ CX
}
, with γ > 1 and kγ a normalizing
constant: kγ =
1∫ ∞
0
dX
Xγ
. The limiting case γ → 1 corresponds to X → ∞,
but γ = 1 must be excluded to avoid a non-normalizable distribution.
If we don’t want to assume anything about the distributions in CX (other
than their being monotonically decreasing), this prior set must be such that
12This list is not exhaustive, see (Troffaes, 2007; Augustin et al., 2014, § 8) for reviews.
13In order to avoid too sharply peaked distributions (at X → 0), constraints can be
placed on the variance of the distributions (namely, an lower bound on the variance),
without it affecting my argument.
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it contains functions of decreasing rates that are arbitrarily small. That is,
∀X ∈ R>0,∀ǫ ∈ R<0, ∃ cγ ∈ CX such that
dcγ(X)
dX
> ǫ. This requirement
applies not to any of the functions in CX but to the set as a whole.
Following the steps of the argument given above in § 1.1, we obtain the
following expression for the distributions in the credal set
{
cγ(r) : cγ(r) ∈ Cr
}
representing our prior credence in r:
cγ(r) =
∫ N=∞
N=r
p(r|N) · cγ(N) dN =
∫ N=∞
N=r
kγ
Nγ+1
dN.
Bayes’ theorem then yields an expression for the posterior credal functions
in CN |r:
cγ(N |r) =
p(r|N) · cγ(N)
cγ(r)
=
kγ
Nγ+1 ·
∫ N=∞
N=r
kγ
Nγ+1
dN
.
For each credal function in CN |r, we can find a prediction for N with a
95%-level confidence, by solving cγ(N ≤ x|r) = 0.95 for x, with
c(N ≤ x|r) =
∫ x
r
c(N |r) dN.
We will find a prediction for N given by our imprecise posterior credal set
CN |r by determining its upper bound, i.e., a prediction all distributions
in CN |r can agree on. Now, as γ → 1, the prediction for x such that
cγ(N ≤ x|r) = 95% diverges. In other words, this imprecise representation
of prior credence in N , reflecting our ignorance about N , does not yield any
prediction about N .
Choosing any of the predictions given by the individual distributions in
the credal set would be arbitrary. Without the possibility for my prior cre-
dence to be represented not by a single probability distribution but by an
infinite set of probability distributions, I cannot avoid obtaining an arbitrar-
ily precise prediction. Other distributions (e.g., that decrease at different
rates) could be added to the prior credal set, as long as they fulfill the cri-
teria listed at the beginning of this section. However, no other distribution
we could include would change this conclusion.
3.3 Blurring Out Anthropic Predictions
We are ignorant about what value of the vacuum energy density ρV we
should expect from our current theories. We can see that representing our
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prior ignorance or indifference about the value of the vacuum energy density
ρV by an imprecise credal set can limit, if not entirely dissolve, the appeal
of anthropic considerations.
If we substitute imprecise prior and posterior credences in the formula
from (Weinberg, 2000, see infra § 1.2), we have dCρV = ν(ρV ) · C
⋆
ρV
dρV ,
with C⋆ρV a prior credal set that will exclude all values of ρV outside the
anthropic range, and ν(ρV ) the average number of galaxies which form for
ρV , which as in § 1.2 peaks around the mean value of the anthropic range.
In order for the prior credence C⋆ρV to express our ignorance, it should be
such that it doesn’t favor any value of ρV .
With the imprecise model, such a state of ignorance can be expressed by
a set of probability distributions {c⋆i : c
⋆
i ∈ C
⋆
ρV
}, all of which normalizable
over the anthropic range and such that ∀ρV ,∃ c
⋆
i , c
⋆
j ∈ C
⋆
ρV
such that ρV is
favored by c⋆i and not by c
⋆
j .
14 Such a prior credal set will not favor any
value of ρV . In particular, it is possible to define this prior credal set so that
for any value of ρV , the lowest expectation value among the the posteriors is
lower than the highest expectation value among the priors. If then we adopt
interval dominance as a criterion for decision-making (see infra § 3.1), then
no observation of ρV will be able to lend support to our anthropic prediction.
One may object to the adoption of interval dominance in such a case.
This criterion is arguably not fined-grained enough to help us for most of
the inferences we are likely to encounter. However, this choice of demanding
decision rule can be motivated by the fact that we have no plausible alter-
native theoretical framework to the anthropic argument. In this context, it
can be reasonable to agree to increase one’s credence about the anthropic
explanation only if it does better than any other yet unknown alternative
might have done. Nonetheless, if we adopt other decision rules, it is possible
with the imprecise model to construct prior credal sets that define a large
interval over the anthropic range such that the confirmatory boost obtained
after observing ρV is not nearly as vindicative as it is with a single, uniform
distribution.
This approach doesn’t prevent Bayesian induction altogether. All the
functions in C⋆ρV being probability distributions that can be treated as in
orthodox Bayesianism; any of them can be updated and, in principle, con-
verge toward a sharper credence, provided sufficient updating.
14This can be obtained, for instance, by a family of Dirichlet distributions (preferable in
order to have invariance under redescription (see de Cooman et al., 2009)), each of which
giving an expected value at a different point in the anthropically allowed range. As in
§ 3.2, a lower bound can be placed on the variance of all the functions in C⋆ρV in order to
avoid dogmatic functions.
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4 Conclusion
These cosmic puzzles show that, in the absence of an adequate representation
of ignorance or indifference, a logic of induction will inevitably yield unwar-
ranted results. Our usual methods of Bayesian induction are ill-equipped to
allow us to address either puzzle. I have shown that the imprecise credence
framework allows us to treat both arguments in a way that avoids their un-
desirable conclusions. The imprecise model rests on Bayesian methods, but
it is expressively richer than the usual Bayesian approach that only deals
with single probability distributions.
Philosophical discussions about the value of the imprecise model usually
center around the difficulty to define updating rules that don’t contradict
general principles of conditionalization (especially the problem of dilation).
But the ability to solve such paradoxes of confirmation and avoid unwar-
ranted conclusions should be considered as a crucial feature of the imprecise
model and play in its favor.
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